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package: haproxy

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- add backported patches from 1.5dev



git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/packages@37909 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73
This commit is contained in:
heil 2013-09-05 22:42:31 +00:00
parent 465fa71a86
commit a9334ea84f
8 changed files with 312 additions and 1 deletions
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2
net/haproxy/Makefile
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=haproxy
PKG_VERSION:=1.4.24
PKG_RELEASE:=02
PKG_RELEASE:=09
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://haproxy.1wt.eu/download/1.4/src

36
net/haproxy/patches/0003-MEDIUM-session-disable-lingering-on-the-server-when-.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From d45840bd28f5cf604d320ab9ff308ba7ba8c0b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2013 08:20:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/9] MEDIUM: session: disable lingering on the server when the
client aborts
When abortonclose is used and an error is detected on the client side,
better force an RST to the server. That way we propagate to the server
the same vision we got from the client, and we ensure that we won't keep
TIME_WAITs.
(cherry picked from commit 8615c2af67dc2be07bdb246ed13130fe7d32e3d1)
---
src/session.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/session.c b/src/session.c
index 21ecb9f..9ed932c 100644
--- a/src/session.c
+++ b/src/session.c
@@ -1370,8 +1370,11 @@ resync_stream_interface:
buffer_shutw_now(s->req);
/* shutdown(write) pending */
- if (unlikely((s->req->flags & (BF_SHUTW|BF_SHUTW_NOW|BF_OUT_EMPTY)) == (BF_SHUTW_NOW|BF_OUT_EMPTY)))
+ if (unlikely((s->req->flags & (BF_SHUTW|BF_SHUTW_NOW|BF_OUT_EMPTY)) == (BF_SHUTW_NOW|BF_OUT_EMPTY))) {
+ if (s->req->flags & BF_READ_ERROR)
+ s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER;
s->req->cons->shutw(s->req->cons);
+ }
/* shutdown(write) done on server side, we must stop the client too */
if (unlikely((s->req->flags & (BF_SHUTW|BF_SHUTR|BF_SHUTR_NOW)) == BF_SHUTW &&
--
1.8.1.5

29
net/haproxy/patches/0004-BUG-MINOR-deinit-free-fdinfo-while-doing-cleanup.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From 25d0a14ada411dc73b55b55d5b27599ccd2fa4a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Godbach <nylzhaowei@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2013 16:49:51 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] BUG/MINOR: deinit: free fdinfo while doing cleanup
Both fdinfo and fdtab are allocated memory in init() while haproxy is starting,
but only fdtab is freed in deinit(), fdinfo should also be freed.
Signed-off-by: Godbach <nylzhaowei@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4cc1b0d4ef283b5ace5249483ec7eb3b1fc5d193)
---
src/haproxy.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/haproxy.c b/src/haproxy.c
index 7a09e3f..c163743 100644
--- a/src/haproxy.c
+++ b/src/haproxy.c
@@ -941,6 +941,7 @@ void deinit(void)
free(global.pidfile); global.pidfile = NULL;
free(global.node); global.node = NULL;
free(global.desc); global.desc = NULL;
+ free(fdinfo); fdinfo = NULL;
free(fdtab); fdtab = NULL;
free(oldpids); oldpids = NULL;
--
1.8.1.5

110
net/haproxy/patches/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-server-set-the-macro-for-server-s-max-wei.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
From ee591233efd57d625fea9057a975281fb8f4d358 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Godbach <nylzhaowei@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2013 07:44:53 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] BUG/MEDIUM: server: set the macro for server's max weight
SRV_UWGHT_MAX to SRV_UWGHT_RANGE
The max weight of server is 256 now, but SRV_UWGHT_MAX is still 255. As a result,
FWRR will not work well when server's weight is 256. The description is as below:
There are some macros related to server's weight in include/types/server.h:
#define SRV_UWGHT_RANGE 256
#define SRV_UWGHT_MAX (SRV_UWGHT_RANGE - 1)
#define SRV_EWGHT_MAX (SRV_UWGHT_MAX * BE_WEIGHT_SCALE)
Since weight of server can be reach to 256 and BE_WEIGHT_SCALE equals to 16,
the max eweight of server should be 256*16 = 4096, it will exceed SRV_EWGHT_MAX
which equals to SRV_UWGHT_MAX*BE_WEIGHT_SCALE = 255*16 = 4080. When a server
with weight 256 is insterted into FWRR tree during initialization, the key value
of this server should be SRV_EWGHT_MAX - s->eweight = 4080 - 4096 = -16 which
is closed to UINT_MAX in unsigned type, so the server with highest weight will
be not elected as the first server to process request.
In addition, it is a better choice to compare with SRV_UWGHT_MAX than a magic
number 256 while doing check for the weight. The max number of servers for
round-robin algorithm is also updated.
Signed-off-by: Godbach <nylzhaowei@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit a34bdc0ea402ea5be1e9d7f80eaddec772b94393)
---
doc/configuration.txt | 2 +-
include/types/backend.h | 4 ++--
include/types/server.h | 2 +-
src/cfgparse.c | 6 +++---
src/lb_fwrr.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index 6e0add7..a008cd7 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ balance url_param <param> [check_post [<max_wait>]]
processing time remains equally distributed. This algorithm
is dynamic, which means that server weights may be adjusted
on the fly for slow starts for instance. It is limited by
- design to 4128 active servers per backend. Note that in some
+ design to 4095 active servers per backend. Note that in some
large farms, when a server becomes up after having been down
for a very short time, it may sometimes take a few hundreds
requests for it to be re-integrated into the farm and start
diff --git a/include/types/backend.h b/include/types/backend.h
index dc4786e..1067125 100644
--- a/include/types/backend.h
+++ b/include/types/backend.h
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@
* weight modulation even with small weights (eg: 1). It should not be too high
* though because it limits the number of servers in FWRR mode in order to
* prevent any integer overflow. The max number of servers per backend is
- * limited to about 2^32/255^2/scale ~= 66051/scale. A scale of 16 looks like
- * a good value, as it allows more than 4000 servers per backend while leaving
+ * limited to about (2^32-1)/256^2/scale ~= 65535.9999/scale. A scale of 16
+ * looks like a good value, as it allows 4095 servers per backend while leaving
* modulation steps of about 6% for servers with the lowest weight (1).
*/
#define BE_WEIGHT_SCALE 16
diff --git a/include/types/server.h b/include/types/server.h
index 14e4d1f..9fbd290 100644
--- a/include/types/server.h
+++ b/include/types/server.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
/* various constants */
#define SRV_UWGHT_RANGE 256
-#define SRV_UWGHT_MAX (SRV_UWGHT_RANGE - 1)
+#define SRV_UWGHT_MAX (SRV_UWGHT_RANGE)
#define SRV_EWGHT_RANGE (SRV_UWGHT_RANGE * BE_WEIGHT_SCALE)
#define SRV_EWGHT_MAX (SRV_UWGHT_MAX * BE_WEIGHT_SCALE)
diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
index 345b415..7d349b3 100644
--- a/src/cfgparse.c
+++ b/src/cfgparse.c
@@ -3639,9 +3639,9 @@ stats_error_parsing:
else if (!strcmp(args[cur_arg], "weight")) {
int w;
w = atol(args[cur_arg + 1]);
- if (w < 0 || w > 256) {
- Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : weight of server %s is not within 0 and 256 (%d).\n",
- file, linenum, newsrv->id, w);
+ if (w < 0 || w > SRV_UWGHT_MAX) {
+ Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : weight of server %s is not within 0 and %d (%d).\n",
+ file, linenum, newsrv->id, SRV_UWGHT_MAX, w);
err_code |= ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/src/lb_fwrr.c b/src/lb_fwrr.c
index d92b6eb..7f5c8a9 100644
--- a/src/lb_fwrr.c
+++ b/src/lb_fwrr.c
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static void fwrr_queue_srv(struct server *s)
* lower the scale, the rougher the weights modulation, and the
* higher the scale, the lower the number of servers without
* overflow. With this formula, the result is always positive,
- * so we can use eb3é_insert().
+ * so we can use eb32_insert().
*/
s->lb_node.key = SRV_UWGHT_RANGE * s->npos +
(unsigned)(SRV_EWGHT_MAX + s->rweight - s->eweight) / BE_WEIGHT_SCALE;
--
1.8.1.5

41
net/haproxy/patches/0006-BUG-MINOR-use-the-same-check-condition-for-server-as.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 3bd693057420af0cd04132fdfb7c59e56aa90421 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Godbach <nylzhaowei@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 09:48:23 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 6/9] BUG/MINOR: use the same check condition for server as
other algorithms
Such load balance algorithms as roundrobin, leastconn and first will check the
server after being selected with the following condition:
if (!s->maxconn || (!s->nbpend && s->served < srv_dynamic_maxconn(s)))
But static-rr uses the different one in map_get_server_rr() as below:
if (!srv->maxconn || srv->cur_sess < srv_dynamic_maxconn(srv))
After viewing this difference, it is a better choice for static-rr to use the
same check condition as other algorithms.
This change will only affect static-rr. Though all hash algorithms with type
map-based will use the same server map as static-rr, they call another function
map_get_server_hash() to get server.
Signed-off-by: Godbach <nylzhaowei@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8f9fd2f0a0893761afeb6800c7b62a51d782af0e)
---
src/lb_map.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/lb_map.c b/src/lb_map.c
index 49805ad..9858249 100644
--- a/src/lb_map.c
+++ b/src/lb_map.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ struct server *map_get_server_rr(struct proxy *px, struct server *srvtoavoid)
avoididx = 0; /* shut a gcc warning */
do {
srv = px->lbprm.map.srv[newidx++];
- if (!srv->maxconn || srv->cur_sess < srv_dynamic_maxconn(srv)) {
+ if (!srv->maxconn || (!srv->nbpend && srv->served < srv_dynamic_maxconn(srv))) {
/* make sure it is not the server we are try to exclude... */
if (srv != srvtoavoid) {
px->lbprm.map.rr_idx = newidx;
--
1.8.1.5

36
net/haproxy/patches/0007-MINOR-config-warn-when-a-server-with-no-specific-por.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
From 8c1b1be9e4f11a8474f64dcb85d507a57b6cfe9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 17:19:08 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/9] MINOR: config: warn when a server with no specific port
uses rdp-cookie
Mathew Levett reported an issue which is a bit nasty and hard to track
down. RDP cookies contain both the IP and the port, and haproxy matches
them exactly. So if a server has no port specified (or a remapped port),
it will never match a port specified in a cookie. Better warn the user
when this is detected.
(cherry picked from commit 82ffa39bfd34e5680cb65cc0b7ef625c0a274856)
---
src/cfgparse.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/cfgparse.c b/src/cfgparse.c
index 7d349b3..cecec03 100644
--- a/src/cfgparse.c
+++ b/src/cfgparse.c
@@ -5638,6 +5638,12 @@ out_uri_auth_compat:
err_code |= ERR_WARN;
}
+ if ((newsrv->state & SRV_MAPPORTS) && (curproxy->options2 & PR_O2_RDPC_PRST)) {
+ Warning("config : %s '%s' : RDP cookie persistence will not work for server '%s' because it lacks an explicit port number.\n",
+ proxy_type_str(curproxy), curproxy->id, newsrv->id);
+ err_code |= ERR_WARN;
+ }
+
#if defined(CONFIG_HAP_CTTPROXY) || defined(CONFIG_HAP_LINUX_TPROXY)
if (curproxy->mode != PR_MODE_HTTP && newsrv->bind_hdr_occ) {
newsrv->bind_hdr_occ = 0;
--
1.8.1.5

31
net/haproxy/patches/0008-MEDIUM-increase-chunk-size-limit-to-2GB-1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From 92518a563b9c1f9117e1dec2cc2a8ae95b1643d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2012 19:20:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 8/9] MEDIUM: increase chunk-size limit to 2GB-1
Since commit 115acb97, chunk size was limited to 256MB. There is no reason for
such a limit and the comment on the code suggests a missing zero. However,
increasing the limit past 2 GB causes trouble due to some 32-bit subtracts
in various computations becoming negative (eg: buffer_max_len). So let's limit
the chunk size to 2 GB - 1 max.
(cherry picked from commit 431946e9617572d2813bd5a8f5a51ce36f841ea3)
---
src/proto_http.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/proto_http.c b/src/proto_http.c
index 22a7737..7fd1fe6 100644
--- a/src/proto_http.c
+++ b/src/proto_http.c
@@ -2112,7 +2112,7 @@ int http_parse_chunk_size(struct buffer *buf, struct http_msg *msg)
break;
if (++ptr >= end)
ptr = buf->data;
- if (chunk & 0xF000000) /* overflow will occur */
+ if (chunk & 0xF8000000) /* integer overflow will occur if result >= 2GB */
goto error;
chunk = (chunk << 4) + c;
}
--
1.8.1.5

28
net/haproxy/patches/0009-DOC-add-a-mention-about-the-limited-chunk-size.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From fdeb2171b83ab4fd5db36f1c45d57e2100529076 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sat, 31 Aug 2013 08:16:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] DOC: add a mention about the limited chunk size
We now indicate that PD flags can be returned for chunk sizes >= 2GB.
(cherry picked from commit f3a3e1389e40434da9e1fc295be6ff5a8037effb)
---
doc/configuration.txt | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/doc/configuration.txt b/doc/configuration.txt
index a008cd7..56438dd 100644
--- a/doc/configuration.txt
+++ b/doc/configuration.txt
@@ -8044,7 +8044,8 @@ easier finding and understanding.
PD The proxy blocked an incorrectly formatted chunked encoded message in
a request or a response, after the server has emitted its headers. In
most cases, this will indicate an invalid message from the server to
- the client.
+ the client. Haproxy supports chunk sizes of up to 2GB - 1 (2147483647
+ bytes). Any larger size will be considered as an error.
PH The proxy blocked the server's response, because it was invalid,
incomplete, dangerous (cache control), or matched a security filter.
--
1.8.1.5